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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Wagner's treatise Beethoven (1870), written to celebrate the centenary of Beethoven's 
birth, is one of his most influential theoretical works. Its influence on Nietzsche's 
Birth of Tragedy is well known, and Gustav Mahler regarded it as one of the most 
profound writings on music he knew, on a par with Schopenhauer's theory on the 
subject. 
     Wagner's main concern in this text is to bring his theory of opera into line with his 
recent 'conversion' to Schopenhauer's philosophy. It contains an account of the 
relation of music and drama which emphasizes the superiority and dominance of 
music, true to the philosopher's ideas on this subject. This aspect of Beethoven is in 
fact the main focus of most commentaries devoted to this work.1 
     Such commentaries often give the general impression that Wagner leaves 
Schopenhauer's philosophy largely intact, merely adapting his own ideas to make 
them fit those of his new mentor.2 In this paper I want to challenge this assumption. I 
will try to show that, on the contrary, Wagner introduces dramatic changes to 
Schopenhauer's aesthetic doctrine, changes that together amount to a substantial 
transformation of the philosopher's thought. To illustrate this, I will concentrate on the 
                                               
1
  See Stein (1960), p 157-165 for a good example of this approach. Also Bruse (1984), Borchmeyer 
(1982), Dinger (1892). 
2
  This is particularly noticeable in Magee (2000), p. 229-300. 
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following aspects of Wagner's text: the relation of music and self-consciousness, the 
question of the position of the musical 'genius' and Wagner's categorization of music 
as the art of the 'sublime'. 
 
  
 
II.  SCHOPENHAUER’S AESTHETICS 
A main feature of Schopenhauer's aesthetic doctrine is the idea that artistic experience 
represents a mode of knowledge that is fundamentally exceptional. Schopenhauer 
holds that human knowledge and experience are mainly determined and guided by the 
will to live. This implies, among many other things, that we normally take an interest 
of one kind or another in the objects of our cognition. It is possible however, 
according to Schopenhauer, for our knowledge to emancipate itself from this 
subservience to the will. The 'subject of knowing' can detach itself from the 'subject of 
willing'; a 'pure', will-less, form of knowing then occurs. The fact that such 'pure 
cognition' is not guided by the will to live has the consequence that the object of 
cognition also becomes transformed: in aesthetic contemplation the Platonic idea, the 
essential nature of the object, stands revealed. The artistic 'genius' sees through the 
veil of mere appearance and glimpses the timeless ideas lying at the basis of them, 
while in addition having the imaginative ability to translate this experience into the 
creation of works of art. 
     Schopenhauer's view of art is fundamentally hierarchical. Different art-forms deal 
with different grades of objectification of the will. The highest art-form, however, is 
not that which has the highest idea (for Schopenhauer that is the human being) as its 
object, as one would expect. Music surpasses all other forms of art because it does not 
depict ideas, but is a direct expression or copy of the will itself. This is the reason why 
Schopenhauer believes that music means the most to us of all the arts, for it speaks of 
the essence, while other art-forms depict only the 'shadow', to follow Schopenhauer's 
highly Platonic expression.(WWR I,  217) 
     This theory raises several problems concerning the precise place of music in 
Schopenhauer's aesthetics. What, for instance, is the status of the musical artist, whose 
object is not the Platonic idea but the 'will' itself? How, furthermore, can this musical 
artist still be seen as the detached viewer who represents Schopenhauer's ideal of 
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artistic cognition? If such detachment cannot be maintained in the case of music, what 
then is music's status as an art? 
 
III.   WAGNERIAN CONTRIBUTIONS 
Few were as aware of such problems as Richard Wagner. In his Beethoven, the 
composer seeks to address these issues by developing a very personal musico-
philosophical argument. Wagner states that, while in Schopenhauer these questions 
are not answered satisfactorily, the philosopher nonetheless offers enough material to 
supplement his thought. This means we have to look at other areas of the 
philosopher's work to enrich his account of music. As a first result of this strategy, 
Wagner observes that we must regard our inner experience as the basis of the musical 
conception.3 If music is a direct expression of the will, the musical conception must 
have its 'origin' in that aspect of consciousness which is, according to the philosopher, 
most directly aware of the 'thing-in-itself'. In Schopenhauer that is our inner 
consciousness of ourselves.  
     After making a detour into the area of Schopenhauer's theory of clairvoyance, 
which I will not  consider here, Wagner then discusses the musical artist.4 The 
‘inspired’ musician is fundamentally different from other artists, who as ‘pure 
subjects’ achieve a detached state of contemplation of the idea. The musician, whose 
object is the very 'thing-in-itself', is also fundamentally different as a subject: he is in 
a state of identification or 'merging' with the universal will.  
Instead of the serene cognition which is the goal of other artists, the musician's 
element is "highest movement of the will". The overcoming of individuality which for 
the other arts is achieved through pure will-less cognition, is reached differently by 
the musician, in whom the will 'feels itself unified' across all boundaries of 
appearance.  
     Having defined the nature of the musician in this way, Wagner goes on to address 
the question of the special status of music as an art. He states that we cannot judge the 
art of music with the category of the purely 'beautiful', as is done so often. In 
Schopenhauer, beauty is defined strictly in terms of the representation of ideas. For 
                                               
3
  Wagner (1896), p. 67 
4
  Ibid. pp. 71-72 
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Wagner, the conclusion from this must be that we can judge music only from the 
perspective of the aesthetic category of the 'sublime'.5 
     It seems clear that Wagner considers this dramatic and somewhat confusing 
expansion of Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory as being largely consistent with the 
main tenets and values of that system. It remains to be seen if that point of view can 
be maintained, however.  I will examine three decisive moments from Wagner's 
discourse in greater detail in order to get a clearer view of the development of 
Wagner's position compared to that of Schopenhauer. 
 
IV.   MUSIC AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 
By establishing a connection between music and self-consciousness at the outset of 
his argument, Wagner shows himself in accord with many subsequent commentators. 
The association of music with ‘inner sense’ is made so often in discussions about 
Schopenhauer's philosophy that one is tempted to overlook the fact that this is not a 
connection that Schopenhauer himself establishes at any point.6 
The argument, though, seems obvious enough. Music, according to Schopenhauer, 
is the most immediate expression of the will. When we combine this with 
Schopenhauer's theory that self-consciousness grants us the most immediate 
apprehension of the will, the association can be readily made. 
 
…the inner knowledge is free from two forms belonging to outer knowledge, the form 
of space and the form of causality which brings about all sense-perception. On the 
other hand, there remains the form of time (...) Accordingly, in this inner knowledge 
the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off its veils, but still does not 
appear quite naked. (...) Yet the apprehension in which we know the stirrings and acts 
of our own will is far more immediate than is any other.”7 
 
For Schopenhauer, the element of immediacy belongs to both the experience of music 
and the experience of the self. An additional argument concerns the element of time in 
both modes of apprehension. Schopenhauer followed the Kantian distinction between 
time as the form of inner, and space as that of outer, sense. By accepting that time is 
                                               
5
  Ibid. pp. 77-78 
6
  For examples: Magee (1997), p. 184; Foster (1999), p. 241, 246. 
7
  Schopenhauer (1819) Vol. 1, p. 230 
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also the parameter in which the cognition of music takes place, we have another 
reason to connect inner sense with the experience of music.  
 
This first of Wagner 's 'clarifications' of Schopenhauer's theory of music, then, seems 
quite uncontroversial. One thing must be born in mind, however. Notwithstanding the 
above observations, Schopenhauer had a good reason not to make an explicit 
connection between music and self-consciousness. Inner awareness is, for 
Schopenhauer, more or less opposed to artistic experience. The willing self is the 
opposite pole from the pure subject of knowing, the subject of all artistic cognition. 
Disinterestedness, a disconnection from the empirical self, is one of the most 
distinctive elements in Schopenhauer's aesthetics taken as a whole. The fact that 
music is discontinuous from the other arts does not entail that for Schopenhauer the 
condition of disinterestedness doesn't apply to music. This makes Wagner's 
connection of music and inner awareness problematic. Wagner is fully aware of this 
fact, and proposes a solution.  
 
V.   MUSICAL GENIUS 
To reconcile his notion that musical conception arises from our self-consciousness 
with Schopenhauer's demand for artistic disinterestedness, Wagner makes a highly 
personal proposition, which has no precedent in Schopenhauer: he identifies the 
musical Genius with the de-individualized basis of the personal subject of willing. 
The musical artist 'awakens' in a state of identification with the universal will itself. In 
a way, this can be regarded as an interesting attempt to fill up a certain lacuna in 
Schopenhauer's account of the artist. Schopenhauer's conception of genius is in terms 
of the contemplation of ideas. Since music does not involve ideas, we could ask 
whether Wagner is in fact not free to characterize the musical genius in entirely 
different terms, as he does here? When we look at Wagner's description of musical 
genius, however, we see that Wagner strays dramatically from the spirit which 
permeates the whole of Schopenhauer's aesthetics. Instead of the elevated, serene 
detachment from the self which is Schopenhauer's ideal of artistic contemplation, 
Wagner describes a 'dissolving' of the self in a state of intoxication, bringing about a 
unity with the will: 
 
MENNO BOOGAARD 
 
 6 
This prodigious breaking-down the floodgates of Appearance must necessarily call 
forth in the inspired musician a state of ecstasy wherewith no other can compare: in it 
the will perceives itself the almighty Will of all things: it has not mutely to yield place 
to contemplation, but proclaims itself aloud as conscious World-Idea.8 
 
This is clearly the voice of the composer of Tristan und Isolde and not that of the 
writer of The World as Will and Representation. The Dionysian flavour of this 
fragment is conspicuously absent from anything Schopenhauer has to say about the 
artist. On the contrary: there are clear signs that the state of deep involvement which 
Wagner associates with the experience of music is far from the philosopher's mind: 
 
Thus we here (in music, MB) see the movements of the will transposed to the area of 
the mere representation9 that is the exclusive scene of the achievements of all the fine 
arts. For these positively demand that the will itself be left out of account, and that we 
behave in every way as purely knowing beings. Therefore the affections of the will 
itself, and hence actual pain and actual pleasure, must not be excited, but only their 
substitutes, that which is in conformity with the intellect as a picture or image of the 
will's satisfaction, and that which more or less opposes it as a picture of image of 
greater or lesser pain.10 
 
     His predominantly negative vision of artistic pleasure, in which the temporary 
liberation from the demands of the will is the decisive factor, is something 
Schopenhauer wants to retain in his account of the experience of music. "Only in this 
way does music never cause us actual suffering, but still remains pleasant even in its 
most painful chords...”11 The pleasure Schopenhauer refers to is, as is obvious form 
the fragment above, the joy of pure cognition rather then the Wagnerian joy of 
intoxication. Schopenhauer is able to translate this view into a compelling image: in 
life we are the string that is played, whereas in music we only hear it, solely through 
tones and their mathematical relations.12 This shows how far Schopenhauer stands 
from Wagner's ideal of deep immersion in the will as a model for the musical genius. 
 
                                               
8
  Wagner (1896) p. 72 
9
  I prefer this translation to Payne's “tinted with the province of representations”. 
10
  Schopenhauer (1819) Vol. 2, p. 451  
11
  Ibid. 
12
  Ibid. 
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VI.   MUSIC AND THE SUBLIME 
A final moment in Wagner's discourse I will comment on is his claim that music 
should be judged according to the category of the sublime, rather than the beautiful: 
 
Music, who speaks to us solely through quickening into articulate life the most 
universal concept of the inherently speechless Feeling, in all imaginable gradations, can 
once and for all be judged by nothing but the category of the sublime; for, as soon as 
she engrosses us, she transports us to the highest ecstasy of consciousness of our 
infinitude.13 
 
At this point we meet a difficulty of interpretation. Wagner fails to give any 
systematic guidance as to what he means by the sublime, other than offering this 
florid description of music as the sublime art. Dieter Borchmeyer has shed some light 
on this issue. In his study Das Theater Richard Wagners he points to several aspects 
of the theory of the sublime, as it was developed in Kant, Schiller and later also 
Schopenhauer, that may be recognized in this passage.14 First of all, in these theories 
the experience of the sublime is accompanied by a 'movement of the soul', while by 
contrast in the experience of the beautiful we remain in restful 
contemplation. Furthermore, the experience of the sublime involves the concept of 
infinitude. Finally, the sublime is associated with inward, rather than outward, 
experience.  
     As we have seen, this last element, that of interiority, has been associated with 
music by Wagner from the beginning. Also, the combination of the first two elements, 
that of the movement of the soul and that of a feeling of infinitude, seems clearly on 
Wagner's mind where he associates the sublime with the 'highest ecstasy of 
consciousness of our infinitude'. From this we can at least conclude that there is a 
certain continuity in Wagner's thought when he associates music with the sublime. As 
we saw, the 'inspired musician' was described by Wagner as one who looks inwards, 
and in whom the highest movement of the will, a state of ecstasy, is accompanied by 
the suspension of individuality, an immersion in the boundlessness of the universal 
will. This fits well with his identification of music as sublime, if this is interpreted in 
the way Borchmeyer suggests. Wagner distinguishes the beautiful from the sublime 
                                               
13
  Wagner (1896), p. 77 
14
  Borchmeyer (1982), pp. 118-9 
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employing the same schema he used to distinguish the plastic from the musical artist: 
outward, detached contemplation in the one case, and inward exaltation in the other. 
Although key aspects of the classical theory of the sublime may thus be recognizable 
in Wagner's description of music, it must be stressed that Wagner ends up with an 
interpretation of the sublime that is severely at odds with both Kant's and 
Schopenhauer's. Anyone familiar with the Kantian sublime recognizes that Wagner 
completely neglects the emphasis on reason that is of such paramount importance in 
that theory. But also the Schopenhauerian sublime, where that emphasis is lacking, 
does not count as a convincing model for the Wagnerian conception. Most 
importantly, Schopenhauer simply does not associate music with the sublime. This is 
no mere neglect, but has a philosophical background. We saw that in Wagner the 
difference between the sublime and the beautiful is mapped on to the difference 
between music and the other arts. In Schopenhauer this is not the case. For him, the 
feeling of the beautiful and the sublime are distinguished by the manner in which the 
pure subject of knowing detaches itself from the subject of willing. In the 
contemplation of beauty, the pure subject of knowing has achieved the upper hand in 
consciousness without struggle, helped by the very beauty of the object, i.e. those 
qualities of the object that facilitate the knowledge of the idea.15 The feeling of the 
sublime, on the other hand, occurs in the presence of forces that are potentially 
threatening to the individual, for instance when we encounter an impressive natural 
phenomenon. Also in such circumstances, a state of pure contemplation can be 
reached, but we have to force the pure knowing subject to elevate itself above our 
individuality.16  
This conception of the sublime has a number of implications in the context of the 
present discussion. In the first place, the Schopenhauerian sublime is restricted to the 
contemplation of ideas, and therefore unsuited for the association with music that 
Wagner seeks. Furthermore, although the movement of the will plays a significant 
part in Schopenhauer's account of the sublime, the pure, undisturbed cognition of the 
subject remains the deciding factor. This means that the Dionysian connotations that 
we meet in Wagner's description of sublime feeling are not true to the spirit of the 
philosopher's account of the sublime. As Dale Jacquette has put it, in Schopenhauer's 
account of the encounter of the sublime “the individual will ultimately confront its 
                                               
15
  Schopenhauer (1819), Vol. 1, p.  202 
16
  Ibid., p. 204 
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limitations, and senses something like the raw energy of the world as will, while 
glorifying in the superiority of its perception and knowledge over the world as 
appearance, alone on the precipice with the haunting strains of a Wagnerian opera 
thundering in the distance.”17 This image is quite suitable to illustrate the fundamental 
difference in Schopenhauer's and Wagner's conceptions of the sublime and the status 
of the musician. For clearly, in Wagner's case, the musician is cast as the vibrating 
string in that same orchestra which, with Schopenhauer, is contemplated from a 
distance. In comparing this account of the feeling of the sublime with Wagner's, we 
thus encounter the same fundamental differences of the philosopher's thought and the 
artist's vision as before. For Schopenhauer, in the feeling of the sublime the pure 
subject of knowing remains essentially in its state of elevated distance. Again, in 
Wagner this distance vanishes completely, the result being an image of ecstatic and 
intoxicated unity with the will.  
     It should be clear that this is no mere detail but a central point of difference with 
significant implications. In Wagner we find the seeds of what later, in Nietzsche, will 
turn into a full-blown Dionysian affirmation of life. Seen in that light, Wagner's 
interpretation threatens the very core of Schopenhauer's philosophy of pessimism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17
  Jacquette (1996), p. 22 
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